l ____ --===========t·lnterpersonal Linkers by the model. And I wifl attempt to lin k these different studies together using a new theory of communication behavior (Grunig , 1979b) .
EDITOR'S NOTE: To meet space {imitations , Grunig's summaries on the research on the actors in the communications model was cut back considerably. Since the studies on management did not specifically mention concepts from his theory, they were not included.

Science Audience Studies
Audience studies far outnumber stu dies on any other aspect of science communication. They do because the media, professional organ izations of science write rs, and sc ientific organizations asked their communications scientists if there is an audience for science information and , if there is , what that aud ience is like. Scientific agencies want to know if the public has a positive attitude toward science or how such a positive attitude can be created. Other agencies , such as agricultural experiment stations, have deve loped new technology which they want to diffuse to potential users. So they want to know how to facilitate that diffusion .
But, the audience is not fixed for all types of science stories. Rather , stories about different science issues"":situations-bring forth different types of audiences.
Martin Mann , a former president of the NASW, said "scie nce 'readers' and 'no nreaders ' won 't stand still"; that each group "fluctuates rap idly , wildly , and erratically" with "the story, the time , politics, weather .. .. " in Krieghbaum , 19 3 (1967, p. 183) . Mann can be interpreted as cal ling for what I call a situational theory of science audience behavior. Before exploring this situational theory , let's discuss the difference between consummatory use of science news (for pleasure or curiosity) and instrumental use (for solving a problem or dealing with a practicl situation). (See Grun ig, 1979a .) A science writer I worked for a few years ago , Jack Reniree of the National Science Foundation , told me that people read science news for one of two reasons: because of curiosity or because the news affects them in some way. Science communication research bears him out. For example , in an extensive review of the literature on environmental communication (Grunig , forthcoming) . I found a great deal of evidence that most people do not actively seek out environmental information.3 They take in--passively process--information in the med ia about environmental problems because the media have put it on the public agenda. (See Shaw and McCombs , 1977 , fo r an introduction to the agenda-setting idea. ) But the average member of the public seldom makes much use of environmental information un less he is an active environmentalist or unless it relates directly to his own life (such as information on the energy crisis).
One study (S haw and Van Nevel , 1967) suggested that medical specialists first learn of research news in the mass media and then seek more in formation from specialized sources.
But the weight of th e ev ide nce is that people do not read science news in the mass media for its util itarian value. Rather they read it because it is there and it arouses their curiosity. We may ask, however, whether people read science news in other media , especially in specialized magazines or other specialized publications , for functional purposes. A time budget study of mine seemed to support functional usage, as J found magazine readership correlated with specific uses of times.
3Before citing his own research , Grun ig developed patterns of audience studies (Institute of SOCial Research, 1958; Swinehart and McLeod, 1960; Krieghbaum, 1967; Schramm and Wade, 1967; Tichenor, 1965; Patterson, Booth and Smith, 1969 ). Grunig's discussion on situational theory was developed from a report by Tannenbaum (1963) and cited by Krieghbaum with Mann 's response, as quoted here (K rieghbaum , 1967) . His discussion was summarized here , for brevi-
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In fact , functi onal usage can even bridge th e literacy barri er . Brown' s (19 70 ) study of the effec tiveness of pictorial symbols in communicating with illiterate Chilean peasants showed relevance of con tent to be the most important reason why peas ant s used agricultural bulletins. Even illiteracy did not stop communication if the bulletin appeared relevant. Most peasants could find a literate neighbor or child to read the bulletin to them if the information was something they needed.
Consequently, the most reasonable answer to the question of whether people read science for curiosity (consummatory) or functional reasons is a synthesis of the two positions. At times a person may read science information simply because it interests him , at other times he may read it because he can use it.
Buy why a person reads a particular article depends upon whethe r the situation described in an article involves him. Few people read an article on black holes in space or the behavior of polar bears because it relates to their life situations . But they do read about crabgrass fo r functional reasons if their lawns are infested with the weed. The same is true of agricultural information. Not every piece of information coming out of an agricultural college or in an iss ue of Farm Journal is relevant to every farmer. Thus different articles are read for different reasons.
The use of science information for instrumental vs consummatory purposes also helps to explain what Ticheno r, Donohue , and Olien (1970) have called th e knowledge gap o r what Rogers (1976) has calle d the communication effects gap. Put simply, the knowledge-gap hypothesis states that people who already know the most about a subject will gain the most from an information campaign or from med ia coverage of that subject. The "info rmation poor " will learn something but not as much as will the " information rich, " thus widening the knowledge gap. Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien (1973) also suggested tha t the apparent selectivity by the information rich leads to social control because only those who are already knowledgeable about science seek science information.
But later the same research team discovered that th e knowledge gap in a local commun ity existed only on scientific issues from outside the community. When an issue directly affected the community, nearly everyone was well informed about it (Donohue, Tichenor. and Olien, 1975) . Th ese results suggest that when most people in an audience use 21 sc ience in formation fo r functional purposes a knowledge gap does not result. A knowledge gap develops when only a few people find the informati on functionally relevant , or when only those who are more educated find the information has curiosity value.
Th ese results show that there is no single audience and no single reason why audiences use sC ientific information on a particu lar topic. Changing the topic may change th e audiences and their reaso ns for using the information. What is needed . then , is a theory that explai ns why these patterns emerge and that suggests how a science writer can predict what his audiences for a parti cular topic will be like and how they will be using that information.
The two theories that have dominated research on the effects of sc ience communication·-attitude theory and dif fusion theory--do not explain this picture of the audience well , if at all. The domain of diffusion resea rch (e.g. , Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971 ) boasts over 1,500 studies of how people hear about and adopt new id eas and practices. Diffusion studies show that some people (the innovators and ea rl y adopters) hear about new technology before oth ers and that people first hear about new ideas from the mass media. At later stages of the adoption process people seek information from interpersonal so urces before adopting th e new id ea. One can deduce from th is research that ea rl y adopters use information provided by agencies, promoting new ideas and practices , for functio nal purposes and that later addop ters ei th er do not hear about the in formation until nearly everyone is usin g it or that they use it for consummatory purposes . But why? Diffusion research real ly does not say , as it offers little deep explana tory theory.
However, the most important shortcoming of diffusion resea rch is its presupposition th at communication is something that a person or agency does to get other people to do its bidding . Agricultura l colleges wan t farmers to adopt hybrid seed corn. Drug co mpani es wa nt doctors to use their produc ts. Edu ca ti ona l researchers wa nt teachers to use the new tec hniques they have developed. Diffusi on researchers find ou t who followed the advice of these agencies. Diffusion st ud ies describe inform ation flow to audiences . They do not explai n the communication behav ior of audiences.
Attitude research ha s the same problem , (Oskamp , 1979 , provides a su mmary of that research). It is designed for agenc ies with a fixed model of how others should behave and who loo k at communica tion as a " quick fix " for eliciting 22 that behavior. According to attitude theor y, communications change attitudes which in turn program people ' s behavior. Thus , a re sea rcher with a surefire method for changing attitudes would seem to have a solution for many of the behavior problems scientific agencies face--people not using their new ideas , not buying their products ,. not accep ting nuclear power, opposing taxes for sc ience , etc.
Research suggests that attitude theory has little explanatory power. It does show that people who communicate about an issue are more likely to have an attitude on that issue and are more likely to do something (behave) about that issue (Grun ig and Stamm, 1979) . But one message seldom leads to one attitude and one behavior. People have free will. They control their communication , their attitudes , and their behavior. We cannot control all three with a quick commun ication fix .
I have worked for over 10 years on a theory I believe overcomes the faulty presuppositions of diffusion and attitude theory and which explains the communication behavior of science audiences.
The theory assumes that people ca n control their own behavior and that , in some situations , they communicate in an effort to improve that control--that is, they communicate for functional reasons. In other Situations , communication is the behavior they control. That is , people may simply communicate because they enjoy it--t hey communicate for consummatory purposes. The theory is a Situational theory because it assumes that people communicate about specific situations or issues . It assumes that attitudes, persona lily traits , and similar cross-situational concepts do not explain the reasons why people commun ica te. Attitudes and personality traits do not program people to communicate. People commun icate when a situation arouses their interest or when they must deal with a problem in the situation. The theory states that how a person perceives a situation affects whether he communicates about a situation and how he communicates . Thus, the theory seems to explain when audiences will communicate about science topics and wh ether that communication will be instrumental or consummatory. Note that the theory explains communication behavior. It does not explain attitude chan ge or adoption. This is not a shortcoming of the theory , however, as the reponsibility of science writers and other professional communicators is to facilitate communication , not to manipulate people. Thus, the theory seems adm irabl y su ited to problems of professiona l communicators.
Three va riables of the th eory explain whe n a person co mmunica te s. These are cal led " problem recogn iti on," " co nstraint recognition ," and the presence of a " referent criterion . "
Probl em recognition represents the extent to which a person recogni zes that somethin g is miss ing or ind eterminat e in a situation so that he stops to think ab ou t it. Th e conc ept essentially derives from John Dewey ' s (1938) idea that people do not think or inq uire (commun icate) abou t a situation unless it is problematic to them. Th us problem recogn ition increa ses the probabi lity that a person will communicate about a situation and wi ll need information about it. In actual stud ies. problem recog nition has been meassured by pre senting survey respo nde nt s with a list of 8-20 si tuations related to an organization or problem and asking them if they oiten , some times. rarely , or neve r stop to thi nk about each situation .
Constraint recognition represents the ex tent to which a person pe rceives constraints that limit his freedom to constr uct his own behavior. If a person real izes that his fre edom to do someth ing about a si tuation is limited , then inform ati on that helps him to plan and mak e decisions abo ut what to do has little value . Const raint recognition has been measu red by asking subjects, for eac h of the sam e 8-20 situations , whether anyth ing th ey might do, pers onally , would make great, some , little , or no differenc e in th e way th e situations are handled .
A referent criterion is an " attitude " which a person cal) use to decide what to do about a situa tion . Howeve r, it is a different kind of attitud e from that described by soc ial psychol ogica l theories. In co ntras t to the attitude concep t in tho se th eories , which assume tha t attitud es contrOl th e behavior of people in different situations, th e referen t criterion is a guid e learned in previou s situations which the person uses with discretion in a new one. In a ne w situation the .person may apply the re fe ren t criterion as an initial guide for resolving the situation . If the old criterion seems to work the person will use it . If it does not, he develops a new so lution-: a new criterion --to guide his behavior in th e new si tuati on. Th e referent crite rion influences a person ' s communication beha vio r because it subsumes what he has learned in previous , related situations and thus redu ces his need for new infor mation to deal with a new situation. Presence of a re-24 Journal of Applied Communications, Vol. 62 [1979], Iss. 4, Art. 5 http://newprairiepress.org/jac/vol62/iss4/5 DOI: 10.4148/1051-0834.1882 ferent criterion has been measured by asking whether each respondent had a very clear , somewhat clear, hazy, or no idea of what to do about each situation, The fourth variable in the theory, level of involvem ent, also explains when a person will commun icate. But, more importantly , it explains how he wi ll communicate, Level of involvement is defined as the extent to which a person perceives a connection with the situa ti on. It is measured by asking if the respondent sees a strong , moderate, weak , or no connection with the Situation. The stronger the connection with a situation , the more probable it is that the person wi ll communicate about it.
Level of involvement also predicts whether a person 's communication behavior will be active or passive. I define passive com mun ica tion behavior as information processin g and active communication behavior as information seeking . A person purposively seeks information which has functional utility for him in deciding what to do in a situation. Thus , information seeking occurs when the perceived level of involvement is high. In co ntrast. a person does not look for and generally does not need information which he processes. It is used for consummatory reasons. He may take it in , however, as a means of passing time-such as watching TV or reading a magazine while waiting for an appointmentor for enjoyment -such as reading a novel or human interest story, watching some TV programs. or even reading agricultural o~ science magazines.
The distinction between information seeking and processing is important in choosing a medium and a communicatio n strategy. If a public seeks information , specialized media such as booklets , magazines. seminars or interpersonal contacts are most effective.
When a person processes information , the most effective media are mass or generalized media wh ich people use when they have available time. Style and creativity are important in facilitating information processing , because a message must get a person 's attention and keep his interest if he is to process the information.
Style and creativity are not as important for information seeking because then the person makes an effort to obtain and understand the message.
This theory seems to explain the communication behavior of audiences for science information . Level of involvement , in particular, seems to exptain how people use sc ience information-for instrumental (information seeking) rather 25 than consummatory (information processing) purposes. A person who perceives a high level of involvement in a situation seeks science information for instrumental use. If crabgrass , for example , invades his lawn. the person will search for information on how to control it. But few people perceive an involvement with such scientific problems as black holes. whale populations. or animal genetics (especially if they are not farmers). If they have time available. these people will process such low-invol vement information when it comes to them randomly without any effort on their part. But they will internalize little of that information unless they are curious about the scientific problem-that is. recognize it as a problem. Those with high problem recognition , research shows , will seek out information related to the sc ientific problem and will remember the in formation they process. The theory also provides an explanation for the knowledge gap because research also shows that people who recognize abstract science problems usually are more educated and have taken coursework related to science.
The four independent variables of this theory have been developed not only as basic theoretical concepts which explain communication behavior, but also as key indicators which a professional communicator should measure and use when preparing science information for different audiences. I have used it for several such studies. In those studies we have generally measured each concept fo r 8-16 different situations. For example. in a study of environmental communication (Grunig , forthcoming) we applied the model to eight environmental issues: air pol lution , the energy shortage , flood control projects. extinction of whales , strip mining. pesticides. fertil.izer run-off , and nuclear power plants. Then we used a series of multivariate techniques (factor analysis , canonical correlation , and discriminant analysis ) to locate specific combinations of perceived situations which define different publics. For example. the environmental study showed that extinction of whales. air pollution , and the energy c'risis each brought about separate publics whereas the other five situations brought about the same publics .
We have used the combination of the lour variables for each public to develop probabilities that different kinds of publics will seek or process information (Grunig and Disbrow , 1977) . These probabilities indicate the likelihood of successful communication-either seeking or processing of information-with each public as well as the topics most li-kely to bring about an audience large enough to make communication worth the professional communicator ' s effort. Most recently , I have developed the theory into a mathematical model that shows interactions between variables. That model indicates when it might be possible to use communication to intervene in communication behavior. That is , it shows when to use information processing that occurs randomly to increase problem recognition and level of involvement to in turn increase the probability that a person will seek or process information (Grunig , 1979b) . The results show that a profess ional communicator does not always have to be content with an existing audience and that under certain limited Circumstances he may enlarge his audience th rough com mu n ication.
Of the most interest here, however, are the results of studies based on this theory which involve science communication.
Research on environmental publics using this theory (Grun ig , forthcoming) showed that most people think about environmental problems but feel constrained from dOing anything about them. In addition , all but active environmentalist publics perceive a low level of involvement with environmental issues, Only when an environmental issue directly involves everyone does the nonactivist public actively seek information about it. Thus these measures of the variables of the theory explain why most people have only a superficial knowledge of environmental issues but sti!l know the issues are important to society . They process the information prominent in the med ia, but , because of low level of involvement , do not seek it out or think much about it.
In these environmental studies , Stamm and I (S tamm and Grunig , 1977; Grunig and Stamm , 1979 ) also developed a situational definition of attitude: It states that people develop and change attitudes to fit situations. That is , people contrOl their attitudes; the attitudes do not control them . Using this definition of attitude , we found that members of the public tended to use a pro-environmentalist attitude -Io believe that the waste or deterioration of scarce resources should be simply stopped (wha t we called a " reversal of trends" position) -unlil their perceived level of involvement in the situation increased , as it did with the energy issues. (See Levy and Ki lburn , 1979 , for further evidence of the high involvement of people with the energy shortage.) On the involving issues people combined a "reversal of trends " attitude with a " functional substitutes" attitude that favors the 27 use of an equivalent resource when a scarce resource is depleted. In our terminology. people " hedged " seemingly incompatible attitudes when the situation was one in which no single solution--" attitude " --seemed to resolve it.
Recently . we conducted a comparative study of university journalism and business students to determine whether the two groups fell into different kinds of publics for corporate economic education programs (Grunig. 1979c) . Rightly or wrongly. corporat ions believe that the. media are biased toward business and that the way to resolve the proble! 1 is to " educate " journalism students . thus changing their attitudes and behaviors when they become working journalists. We thought this presupposition could best be tested by comparing journalism students with business students. We did find a difference in the two groups. but the difference was not attitudinal. Using our situational definition of attitude. we found that students in both groups were both proand anti-business. depending upon the issue. If anything. the business students were more anti-business on more issues than the journalism students.
However. the level of involvement and problem recognition variables showed that journalism students would seek information only about business issues which directly affect the public. such as pollution and product price and quality. On the other hand. the results showed that business students would be more likely to both seek and process information on business issues which are not likely to invo lve the public. such as government regu lation. taxation , or size of corporate profits . Therefore. the study suggests. that business-media conflict is not so much a difference in attitude as a difference in views of which issues are salient. The media want to report the consequences of business actions on the public , whereas business executives want the media to cover their pet issues even though the public is not interested. I suspect the same also is true for SCientific agencies which dislike media coverage of the impact of such technology as nuclear power plants . fertifizers , or pesticides.
Jenkins (1976) also used the theory in a study of the use of science news in the mas s media by university students. His results were much like those fo und in other science audience studies, and they fit the theory in the way hypothesized here. The active information seeking students-with more problem recognition , etc .-were non -sc ience students with some science background. The science students 28 did not seek science information from the mass media , presumab ly because they get it from more specialized sources such as journals or their major co urses.
Jenkins' results link directly to the results of three studies of how scientists use the information provided to them by internal publications of the organizations for which they work (Grunig, 1977b; Pelham , 1977; Schneider, 1978) . These three studies , as well as a study by Dunwoody and Scott (1979) , showed that scientists have a high level of involvement only in science topics within their own narrow specialization. On other science topics sCientists are as much laymen as are nonscientists. Scientists would seek information related to their own resea rch from technical publications and sem inars. But they spend little time with internal media, reading other resea rch done by the organization. We found that scientists will process information about the work of other scientists only if it is easily available and they have time available. Thus , ease of access, tim in g, and brevity are especially important in preparing publications , newspapers , or exhibits designed to facilitate commun ication among sCi-, entists dOing different kinds of research within the same organization.
Science Writ ing Stud ies
Situational theory can help research ers understand the role of wri ti ng techniques and the reader's ability to understand the information presented. In three studies of rhetorical devices (Grunig , 1974) , I used Richard Carter 's signaled slopping technique (Carter et at. , 1973) to try to get at understanding. With the signaled stopping te chn ique , experimenta l subjects read different versions of articles on economics, placed a slash mark at the po ints in the article where they felt like stopping , and ind icated their reason for stopping--to agree , disagree , ask a question , to think about implications , to think because of co nfusion , or other reasons. Then I reasoned that thinking about implications would be a logical antecede nt to understanding and used the number of stops for that reason as my dependent variable. The more times someone stops to think about implications of what he is reading , I reasoned , the more likely he would be to reconstruct the idea being communicated. I also asked the subjects , in a direct question . how well they thought they understood the articles they read . Initial results of these studies showed very little difference between stories conta ining analogies, examples , and parab les and an article containing none of these devices.
Howe ver, as the research progressed , I began to con trol for level of problem recognitio n and constraint recognit iontwo of the variables from my situational theory. Then significant results began to emerge. Subjects who had high problem recognition and low constraint recognition , which the theory predicted would be seeking and proceSSing information , stopped to think about implications more and reported a higher level of understand in g than subjects the theory predicted were less likely to seek or process information , regardless of what kind of writing device was used. For the actively commun icating subjects , analogies and parables stimulated thinking and understand ing. Examples , however, stimulated less thinking than did writing using none of these devices . Bartholomew (1973 ) repl icated this study using analog ies only. He had a group of journalism students and a group of physics students read articles on physics taken from Isaac Asimov's Understanding Physi cs. He found that analogies ca used physics students to stop to think and to report more understand ing , but the same was not true for the journalism students. He traced the cause to lack of communication by journalism students which he attributed to constraint recognition--fear of mathematicS.
The results of these studies ind icate that the style of a sc ience story is less important than whether the content is relevant to the pe rce ived situation of the reader. Thus the. studies indicate that a science writer should be most concerned with story selection if he hopes to ach ieve understanding of science. Bu t the findings also show the difficulty of commu nicating with people who do not perceive a prob·Iem to which the scientific topic relates or who cannot apply the information because of const raints in their situation. The students in these studies did not stop to think about the information even when an att empt was made to make the information more understandable and when the experimental cond ition forced them to read it. ·The results of these two studies (Grunig , 1974 ; Bartholomew, 1973) seem to be explained by the research described above. In it I fit a mathematical model (a se t of simultaneous equations) to data from environmental and economic studies to de termin e interactions between variables. The results of this effort (Grun ig , 1979b) showed that random information proceSSing could increase problem recognition whi ch could 30 in turn stimulate more information processing and seeking. At this pOint in our research we really do not know what communication techniques , if any , are most likely to get the interest of people who are randomly processing information. We know that analogies and parables help people who are actively communicating about sc ience to understand it better. Yet we do not really have an adequate theoretical explanation of why.
Editors
Research on editor behavior in dealing with science articles has not been extensive , although editors have often been accused of being the weak link between scientists and the public. Editors supposedly doom many scie nce stories to the overset, write the misleading headlines scientists complain about, and fail to see the news value in science stories. Their lack of interest also would explain why newspapers devote less than 5 percent of their space to science (N un n, 1977) .
In fact , the research does show that editors recognize different problems tha n scientists and science writers and app ly differ~nt referent criteria , as I have defined these two terms (Tannenbaum, 1963; Johnson , 1963 ; University of Missouri 1973; Patterson, Booth and Smith , 1969) . Scientists see science stories from the standpoint of scientific interests , wh ile editors see them from what they perceive as the pub lic interest. Science writers see science more like scientists than do the editors. These studies also show that scientists pay more attention to what is said , whereas editors pay attention to how it is said.
Although editors evaluate science stories from the perspective of what they think is the public interest, they are not very adept at predicting what will interest the public. Studies of editors show that the scientist, science writer and pub li c have similar views about science, but that the editor is out of tune with the others (Tannenbaum , 1963; Patterson , Booth and Smith, 1969) . We can infer that the misperception of editors leads to media science content that is not of interest to the public. Thus , research on editors suggests that editors may be the source of such inaccuracies as omissions and misleading head lines that accuracy researchers have found to be co mmon in science stories.
In theoretical terms , we might hypothesize that the ed itor's unique science commun ica tion behavior results because he does not share the referent criteria of the science 31 system. The editor could be the one actor in the communication link from scientist to public-or public to scientist-who forces science writers to provide " know ledge about" science to the public and to ask scientists socially relevant questions. Too often . however. editors do not understand the public's interest in science. Their gatekeeping decisions are based more on competition, deadlines , and writi ng style. To understand why, we need more studies of the science communication behavior of editors similar to those of the science communication behavior of audiences.
Scientists
Scientists communicate with each other as well as with the lay public , and the re have been studies of both types of scientist communication behavior. Studies of scientists communicating with other scientists (Garvey, 1967; Garvey, 1970; Crane , 1972; Nelson and Pollock , 1970 ; Garvey , Lin , Nelson , and Tomita, 1970) show that SCientists communicate within specialized communities or " invisible colleges," although Garvey (1970) fo und that social scientists communicate more randomly than physical scientists. In addition to this literature from the sociology of science, a great deal of liter03.ture in the philosophy of science discusses the difficulty scientists from different research traditions have in commun icating with each other (e .g. Kuhn , 1970; Bohm , 1977 , Popper, 1970 .
I believe most of this literature can be explained with my theory of communication behavior. Scientists are most likely to communicate with other scientists who are involved in research from the same scientific domains and who recognize similar scientific problems within those domains . Also. scientists communicate best with scientists who have the same theo ries (referent criteria) and who are constrained by the same research techniques. This is an area of research that I would like to pursue further in order to test these hypotheses . It is an area of research that would be useful to science writers who need to know how to identify sc ientific communities , compare and contrast different schools of thought. and locate sources of scientific information.
Of more relevance to the model in Figure 1 , however, is the communication of scientists with the public. Krieghbaum (1967: 160-177) has described some of the co nstraints that discourage scientists from communicating with the public , such as the priority of journal publication , peer pressure against popularizing , and the necessity of peer review. Goo-
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Journal of Applied Communications, Vol. 62 [1979], Iss. 4, Art. 5 http://newprairiepress.org/jac/vol62/iss4/5 DOI: 10.4148/1051-0834.1882 dell (1977: 19-38) studied seven " visible scientists " who actively communicate with the public on controversia l issues . Her results also fit into my explanation of why a person actively communicates -in this case by actively giving information. Her results suggest that a scientist must first free himself of the constraint of peer pressure by establishing himself as a credible researcher before he can be involved in public issues . (Boltanski and Maldidier, 1970 . reached the same conclusion from a study of French scientists. )
Goodell's research suggests that actively communicating scientists recognize broad public problems (what she calls " hot topics ") related to their area of expertise , and perceive a high level of involvement in the consequences of these problems on the public. Finally , she found that these scientists are articulate-able to communicate science in the language of the layman . One could interpret the inability to communicate as a constraint facing the average sc ientist and conclude that the visible scientists are more likely to com municate because they are free of that constraint. In addition , Goodell's research indicates that visible scientists are controversial and have a colorful image. Thus , they are likely to get the att ention of people randomly processing information from the media-editors and casual readers of sc ience in the media.
The assumption behind Goodell 's research is that visible sc ientists are different from the average scientist. The average sc ientist, according to much of the literature on science communicat io n, avoids contact with the media because of the cons train ts identified by Krieghbaum and others. However, a recent study by Dunwoody and Scott (1979) showed that 75 percent of a sample of Ohio State and Oh io University scientists said they welcome contact with the mass media .
The sc ientists in the Dunwoody and Scott study also said they preferred making co ntact with magazine journalis ts rather than newspaper journalists. This difference seems to reflect a preference for coverage by the instrumental med ia rather than the consummatory media. Consummatory coverage of scie nce appears to be the source of the complaints of sCientists about sensational ism and humorous treatment of sc ience in the media.
linkers
We will not do too much damage to t he orga nizational concept of a linker if we apply it to ind ividuals who serve a bridg-33
ing function between scientists and publics. Examples of such linkers are agricultural extension agents , salesmen for technical products or medical supplies. community leaders , or specialized teachers such as physical education or health teachers. The re levant research question about linkers is. "How do they communicate? " Early diffusion research (Wilkening , 1956) showed that farmers most often communicate with agri cultural extension agents and salesmen at the stage of decision making when they are trying to put a change into effect. Media, on the other hand , make farmers aware of possible changes , and other farmers help farme rs decide whether to adopt a change . It is reasonable to conclude from diffusion research that members of the public are the active communicators , not the linkers.
I have theorized that people communicate most effectively with one another when thei r perceived situations are sim ilar -when they recognize similar problems , face similar constraints , perceive involvement in similar situations , and have similar referent criteria. This hypothesis would explain research by Jain (1970) wh ich showed that extension specialists whom their peers rated as most effective were those who engaged in diverse communication behaviors rath er than in large amounts of communication behavior. The effect ive linke rs, it wou ld appear, perceive diverse situations in a way that stimu 'ates communication , even if their co mmunication behavior is only information processing. Th en when farmers or other members of the public with more specialized interests come to the linkers for information , the linkers will be able to provide relevant information to diverse client groups. Research related to the " opinion leaders" by Atkin (1972) also supports this conclusion. Because of their role as an information source in a social system. opinion leaders recognize many different problems which in turn stimulate them to seek out information relevant to these problems. Op inion leaders recognize diverse problems because the socia l system expects them to.
Research on linkers suggests that if we want linkers to be good sources of information sought by others they shou ld be able 10 perceive these problems and the constraints of the people they serve that will motivate them to seek out re levant information (see Grunig , 1978) . If we want them to be active disseminators of information to the public we shou ld define their role in the organization as tha t of a communicator so that they perceive communication with the 34
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Journal of Applied Communications, Vol. 62 [1979], Iss. 4, Art. 5 http://newprairiepress.org/jac/vol62/iss4/5 DOI: 10.4148/1051-0834.1882 public as a prob lem and feel involved with that communication process . We also should eliminate their perceived constraints to communication by teaching them how to communicate .
Intera ct ion s
Most of the research on interactions between the actors has been based upon . or can be interpreted in terms of, McLeod and Chaffee 's (1973) coorientation model. Coorientat ion simp ly means that two actors simultaneously orient to and commun icate about the same problem. topic or situation. The McLeod and Chaffee model as I have reconstructed it in Figure 2 assumes that each actor has an idea (cognition) about the situation and a positive or negative evaluation of that idea (an " attitude "). He also has a perception of the other person 's idea and evaluation of that idea . The variab les in the model can be interpreted as effects of communication . Congruence is the extent to which each person thinks the other person 's idea or evaluat ion is similar to his own. Accuracy is the extent to which one person 's perception of the other person 's idea or evaluation approximates the other person 's actual idea or eva luation . Understand ing represents the extent to which the two ideas are the same. Agreement represents the extent to which the evaluations are the same. Several studies of science communication have measured levels of congruence , accuracy. understanding , or agreement between actors in Fig ure 1 . such as the accuracy with which sc ien ce writers can predict the interest of audiences in different science topics or the understanding and agreement between scientists and science writers on the news value of scientific top ics. Many 01 these studies have been designed to test out common assumptions of working professionals.
Most of these interactional studies have not provided a theoretical explanation for the presence or absence of one or more of the coorientational variables. For example, they have not explained why scientists and science writers do and do not understand each other. One possible theoretical explanation is Rogers and Shoemaker's (1 971 ) concepts of homophily (similarity) and heterophily (dissimilarity). They maintain that two people who are more alike in attitudes, values . or demographic characteristics will commun icate more effectively . To me , however. Rogers and Shoemaker' s concepts are too broad to provide meaningful explanations. In what ways should people be similar? What similarities are most likely to lead to effective communication? Thayer (1968 ) theorized that two people will communicate more often and more effective ly when sy mbiosis is possible -when both gain something from the exchange. I have added to that concept by arguing that people will be most likely to communicate and to communicate effectively when they have symbiotic problem s and constraints (Grunig , 1976) . Under those conditions , a person can seek or give information that will help the other to solve his important problems and to operate within his constraints . Involvement in the same Situations would stimulate communicat ion , but it is not a necessary condition for communication. As long as two people are involved in symbiotic situations , communication can occur. Having similar referent criteria may make communicat ion easier, but it is not a necessary condition for coorientation. Obviously . a person who does not recognize any science problems (as do editors) or who face constraints (such as fear of mathematics) will not communicate otten with those who recognize science problems and who are not similarly constrained .
With th is theoretical explanation in mind , we can now turn to specific interactional studies of science communication.
Tannenbaum described a study which compared the semantic compatibil ity of scientists , science writers , editors , and sc ience readers. He fou nd all the groups to be compat ible . except the editors. The editors generally ~referred "exciting " science news . th e others did not. Th is study thus would explain why the editors are the weak link in the science com.munication cha in . Th ey are not in vo lved in scie nce -or do not reco gni ze science problems. Th us th ey process consum ma tory science news which ge ts their attention while the others seek utilitarian science news or, at least. do not have to have their science news se nsationa liz ed before they will process it.
Lassahn (1967) did a similar study on actors in the agricultural Scien ce communication system. She compa red the ability of uni versi ty extension specialists , information service editors , co unt y ex tension directors , and county newspaper editors to pred ict how farmers would rate sc ience news items that might ap pear in the newspaper. The county newspaper ed itors and the information service editors were best at predi cting farmer preferences , thu s showing their value as mediators in the science communicati on chain. These two mediator groups wo uld more li kely have symbioti c relationships with both farmers and scientists than the farmers and scientists wo uld have with one another. That is. the professional communicators ca n re cognize the problems and const raints of both scientists and farmers.
Seien t ist -Li n ker -A ud ienee I n I e rae lion s Studies of coori entation be twee n scient ists and the public ci led above co nfirmed th e ability of science writers to perform a med iating function. Similar stud ie s have been done on the mediating ability of interperson al linkers . Groot (1970) found tha t extenSion workers in the Phillipin es fell between fa rm ers and the scien tists in agreement , congruence , and accu racy-th us confirming that they do indeed serve as effecti ve intermediaries .
However, Bowes and Stamm (1975) , found that local community leaders were ineffec tiv e mediators between the public and agencies pro moting resource development in North Dakota . Agency personnel could predict public cogni tions of the development projects belter than the co mmunity leaders-indicati ng that comm unity leaders are not a good sou rce of information about public opin ion.
These two st udies provide no ind ic atio n of why some linkers are effective and others are not. We can only hypothesize that linkers serve as effec ti ve mediators only when the y are able to recog nize the proble ms , co nstraints , and 37 involvements of both scientists and the public and are able to find a symbiotic relationship in those two sets of perceived situations. Presumably. training in how to accurately perceive the situations of their clients is the secret to successful linkage.
Some This literature rev iew shows that we do know a great deal about science commu ni cation. But many of the theoretical explanations which I have presented are speculative. They have not been substantiated by research. Science progresses when researchers take what is orig inally a vague , general idea (a theory ), test that idea , and then reconstruct the theory to improve the originally vague idea (Suppe. 1977) . I believe I have presented some reasonable theoretical ideas in this paper. But they need to be tested. We need to know whether these ideas can be improved further. In addition , there are some specific areas of the science communication chain where the most research is needed:
1. We must develop a typology of agricultural publics and of consumer publics. We also need a typology of publics for energy issues , which should be a top priority because of the severity of the energy problem. We need to know what kinds of publics develop on issues like nuclear power, solar energy, synthetic fuels and conservation of gasoline. We also need studies of the communication behaviors of governmental officials who make decisions on scientific mailers. We have little idea of what their information needs are.
2. We need an adequate explanation of how to communicate well enough so the reader can gain understanding of unfamiliar, scientific ideas. We know that simplification alone does not solve the problem. We know that traditional. writing techniques generally work , but not why they work. I believe it is time to delve into cognit ive psychology and the philosophy of language in the search for a solution.
3. We need to further analyze the behavior of the commun-
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icators. using the same techniques we have used to analyze the behavior of audiences. 4. We ha ve a few studies of the communication behavior of scientists. But we need more. The sociology and phil osophy of science offers some rich resources for understanding the co mmunication of scientists with one another. We sho uld make us e of it in designing future research . In addition . I think we should test out the theoretical explanations I have provided for the communication of scie ntists wit h the public .
5. Th e coor ientational sludies have provided useful lests of man y of the commo n assumptions of scien ce communication , and resea rch has proven many of those assumptions to be wrong. I have suggested a theoretical explanation for the co mmunication effects isolated by these coorientational analyses. Again . however, that explanation needs to be tested.
6. Research has made it clear that scie nce writers often. but not always. identify more with the sc ience system than with the public. Editors identify with the public but do not reco gnize the ir true information needs. Therefore , we need more res ea rch on how professional co mmunicators can become true mediators. able to interact with both SCientists and the public.
